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Intellectual challenges to ﬁ  nancial stability analysis
in the era of macroprudential oversight
This article discusses the main intellectual challenges related to the conceptual foundations, analytical 
models and regulatory assessment tools in the ﬁ  eld of ﬁ  nancial stability analysis. The focus is on ways 
to detect and contain systemic risk. The article also tries to point in directions that could be helpful in 
resolving these intellectual challenges. The article starts with a discussion of the nature and origins of 
ﬁ  nancial stability and systemic risk. It then goes through four areas in which lessons from the present 
crisis have illustrated major analytical challenges in enhancing the understanding of ﬁ  nancial stability 
and systemic risk. 
The article concludes that 1) the understanding of the fundamental working of ﬁ  nancial systems and the 
risks they generate needs to be deepened, in particular in relation to ﬁ  nancial innovation and the role of 
nonbank ﬁ  nancial intermediaries, 2) better insights need to be developed about when and how ﬁ  nancial 
systems migrate from stability to instability, 3) models need to be developed that capture the interactions 
between widespread ﬁ  nancial instability and the performance of the economy at large (including the related 
ampliﬁ  cation effects and nonlinearities), and 4) such models need to be further extended to be able to 
assess the effectiveness and efﬁ  ciency of macroprudential regulatory policies in containing systemic risks. 
Meeting this agenda will require reorienting signiﬁ  cant resources in academia, central banks and 
supervisory authorities in these directions. It will also require enriching the way of thinking in economics 
and ﬁ  nance. New approaches should be considered that do not necessarily rely only on the notions 
of equilibrium, universal rationality and efﬁ  ciency, but go beyond those concepts. Approaches that have 
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Note: The chart shows the Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress (CISS; see Hollo et al., 2010) between 2001 and 2010. The CISS is constructed from several measures 
of instability for each of ﬁ  ve components; money markets, bond markets, equity markets, foreign exchange markets and ﬁ  nancial intermediaries. The ﬁ  ve components 
are aggregated and weighted considering the correlation among each other (systemic dimension) and their correlation with industrial production (real economy 
dimension). The indicator is normalised between 0 (no systemic stress) and 1 (maximum systemic stress). It is calculated in real time using weekly data. 
T
his article discusses the main intellectual 
challenges related to the conceptual 
foundations, analytical models and 
regulatory assessment tools in the ﬁ  eld of ﬁ  nancial 
stability analysis. The focus is on ways to detect 
and contain systemic risk. The article also tries to 
point in directions that could be helpful in resolving 
these intellectual challenges. The new supervisory 
bodies that have just been created in Europe –such 
as notably the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) 
in the European System of Financial Supervision 
(ESFS)– would beneﬁ  t signiﬁ  cantly from intellectual 
progress in those directions.
The article starts with a discussion of the nature 
and origins of ﬁ  nancial stability and systemic risk, 
in particular how systemic risk can be deﬁ  ned 
and which factors can make ﬁ  nancial instability 
widespread and dangerous. It then goes through 
four areas in which lessons from the present crisis 
have illustrated major analytical challenges in 
enhancing our understanding of ﬁ  nancial stability 
and systemic risk. The ﬁ  rst area concerns challenges 
at the very fundamental level of the functioning of 
ﬁ  nancial systems, in particular how they change over 
time through innovation. The second area relates 
to challenges with respect to our understanding of 
the transition from tranquil times to crisis times. 
Third, it is extremely challenging to develop better 
tools assessing the macroeconomic implications of 
ﬁ  nancial instabilities. Fourth and last, we have very 
limited analytical tools and models (and experiences) 
to assess how regulatory policy can be used to contain 
risks at the level of the ﬁ  nancial system as a whole and 
the overall economy. The article ends with some 
concluding remarks.
1| FINANCIAL CRISES, STABILITY 
AND SYSTEMIC RISK
1|1   The meaning of systemic risk 
and experiences with systemic crises
The crisis that we have experienced over the last three 
years is an overwhelming case of the materialisation of 
systemic risk. Systemic ﬁ  nancial risk can be deﬁ  ned as 
the risk that ﬁ  nancial instability becomes so widespread 
that it impairs the functioning of a ﬁ  nancial system 
to the point where economic growth and welfare 
suffer materially.1 Chart 1 displays one indicator 
–a Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress (CISS)– 
that ECB staff developed to capture in real time how 
much systemic instability is present at a given point 
1 ECB  (2009).
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in time.2 The chart clearly shows how systemic stress 
emerged in the European Union in August 2007, how 
the situation degenerated to a full-blown systemic 
crisis in September 2008 with, in particular, the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers (when the indicator 
shoots up towards its maximum value of 1) and how 
the process of relaxation was countered in May 2010, 
in particular due to the Greek debt crisis.
There were many ﬁ  nancial crises in history and a 
share of them reached systemic dimensions. Examples 
include in particular the world’s Great Depression 
in the 1930s and, at national levels, the Nordic and 
Japanese banking crises during the 1990s. 
Every crisis possesses its own characteristics, and 
having learnt the lessons from the last crisis does not 
provide protection against future, necessarily different, 
crises. Moreover, in a dynamic economic system, 
progress and growth can only be achieved in accepting 
risks, which could indeed include a “tail risk” of crises. 
 
The experience of the last three years suggests that 
policy authorities in all advanced economies need 
to improve considerably their capacity to detect and 
contain systemic risks. Financial supervision was too 
much focused on the microprudential dimension of 
individual risks at the level of single intermediaries and 
markets, rather than looking how risks could add up 
and compound each other. In order to become better 
in this regard, authorities need to consider more the 
deep underlying sources of systemic instability and, in 
particular, how risks can reach the systemic dimension. 
1|2   How ﬁ  nancial instability 
can become systemic
Research suggests that there are, in particular, three 
broad ways through which ﬁ  nancial instability can 
reach systemic dimensions.3
The ﬁ  rst is contagion. The failure of one ﬁ  nancial 
agent (or crash of one market) can lead to failures of 
other ﬁ  nancial agents (or crashes of other markets), 
even when the latter have not invested in (or are 
exposed to) the same risks and are not subject to the 
same original shock as the former.4 
Second, widespread ﬁ  nancial imbalances can build up 
over time and then unwind abruptly. Hyman Minsky 
described how in good times consumption and 
investment increase, generating income, which fuels 
the ﬁ  nancing of more consumption and investment but 
also the neglect of increasing risks. Even small events 
can then lead to a re-pricing of risk and an endogenous 
unravelling of the credit boom, which adversely affects 
many agents and markets at the same time.5 
Third, severe negative aggregate shocks can adversely 
affect intermediaries and markets simultaneously. 
Historical research has shown that many banking 
crises were related to severe economic downturns.6 
Note that the three mechanisms can happen 
independently, but that most of the time they are 
mutually reinforcing. 
There are a number of inherent features of ﬁ  nancial 
systems that make them particularly prone to these 
forms of systemic risk. 
The ﬁ  rst is externalities. They particularly relate 
to the complex and dynamic network of exposures 
among major intermediaries. What in tranquil 
times is an efﬁ  cient mechanism to share risk, can, 
in times of stress, become a dangerous channel for 
transmitting instability. Two contracting parties 
do not have an incentive to take account of the effects 
of their risk-taking on third parties. As a consequence, 
the risk at the level of the system may be higher than 
the sum of perceived individual risks. 
The second feature is asymmetric information. 
Financial systems allocate funds from agents who 
have them but possess no speciﬁ  c knowledge about 
promising investment opportunities, to agents who have 
knowledge about the opportunities but not the funds 
to engage in them. This creates an agency problem 
between the two parties, which may be handled more 
or less well through the underlying ﬁ  nancial contracts. 
If contracts are incomplete and negative news arrive 
2  Hollo, Kremer and Lo Duca (2010). The indicator combines instability of different ﬁ  nancial markets and intermediaries, including their links to economic activity. 
Many previous systemic risk indicators focused on the banking system using market data (Avesani, 2005; Hartmann, Straetmans and de Vries, 2006; Segoviano 
and Goodhart, 2009).
3  De Bandt, Hartmann and Peydro (2009) and Trichet (2009).
4  Allen and Gale (2000), Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000) and Chen (1999).
5  Minsky (1977) and Kindleberger (1978).
6  Gorton (1988) and Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998).
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on some of the investment projects, but information 
asymmetries do not allow lenders to judge whether 
this also affects other investment projects, funding 
may evaporate for all projects alike –a phenomenon 
often referred to as adverse selection.7
The special propensity of financial systems to 
systemic risk is not simply the result of these 
two imperfections. Externalities and information 
problems are also present in other economic sectors. 
But there are some other features of financial 
systems, which render their implications much 
more severe and widespread. First, illiquid assets, 
maturity mismatches between assets and liabilities 
and leverage amplify the force with which problems 
of one ﬁ  nancial intermediary are pushed through 
the complex network of exposures. Second, sizable 
amounts of debt relative to capital and short-term 
funding have more dramatic effects in situations 
of stress. These features in conjunction with the 
above imperfections lead to powerful feedback and 
ampliﬁ  cation mechanisms, which may cause sudden 
regime changes, driving the system from a state of 
relative tranquillity to a state of turmoil (see, for 
example, the soaring values of the CISS in August 2007 
and September 2008 in Chart 1). In the aggregate, 
one observes the abrupt nonlinear adjustments that 
are so characteristic of ﬁ  nancial instability. 
A well-developed analytical apparatus for supporting 
policies in this area would have to fully capture all 
these elements. The following sections try to address 
some of the intellectual challenges in providing such 
an apparatus, using the experiences of the present 
and previous crises.
2|   ADVANCING THE ANALYTICAL 
APPARATUS FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY 
AND SYSTEMIC RISK POLICIES
2|1  The basic functioning of ﬁ  nancial 
systems and the risks they imply
The ﬁ  rst set of intellectual challenges in advancing 
the analytical apparatus for ﬁ  nancial stability and 
systemic risk policies relates to the deep functioning 
of ﬁ  nancial systems. The crisis has shown that 
ﬁ  nancial systems are much less understood than 
what was thought. While some important parts 
and implications of the “DNA” of ﬁ  nancial systems 
are known –their main components, their main 
functions, indicators of their efﬁ  ciency or which basic 
risks can emerge–, there are difﬁ  culties in grasping 
the essence of some major mutations (“ﬁ  nancial 
innovations”) and in predicting how the overall body 
reacts to speciﬁ  c stresses; two elements that, on 
occasion, may be strongly related. 
The crisis has taught authorities (and market 
participants) that the early identification of 
the build-up of vulnerabilities and widespread 
imbalances has to become better. The analytical 
apparatus supporting ﬁ  nancial stability policy needs 
to provide authorities with the means to understand 
the efficiency and risks of both new financial 
instruments and new business models of ﬁ  nancial 
intermediaries. 
A second crisis lesson in this area is that not only 
models about the systemic risks in banking are 
needed but also about how nonbank financial 
intermediaries can contribute to the transmission 
of instability at the system level. Brunnermeier and 
Nagel (2004) found that, whilst hedge funds are 
technically among the most sophisticated investors, 
between 1998 and 2000 they were heavily invested 
in technology stocks rather than acting as a price 
correcting force towards fundamental values. More 
generally, the explosion of the industry of highly 
leveraged ﬁ  nancial institutions over the last 20 years 
–from around 100 billion US dollars capital under 
management in 1990 up to 3 trillion US dollars in 
2007– is not yet fully understood in its ﬁ  nancial 
stability implications.8 Also to be noted, the credit 
derivative activities of some insurance companies did 
play a signiﬁ  cant role in the crisis. The activities of 
so-called shadow banks, which were not subject to 
the supervisory regime of banks, played themselves 
a decisive role in the run up to the subprime crisis, 
which has been the trigger of the global ﬁ  nancial crisis.
A third lesson suggests that the image of atomistic and 
highly efﬁ  cient ﬁ  nancial markets needs to be revised. 
As also a growing body of ﬁ  nancial research suggests, 
7  Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
8  Thurner, Farmer and Geanakoplos (2010) illustrate with an agent-based model (see below) how leveraged purchases of under-valued assets by funds can amplify 
asset price ﬂ  uctuations.
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asset valuations, corporate ﬁ  nancing activities and 
intermediation processes are subject to a range of 
important imperfections to which greater attention 
is warranted. The two examples of externalities and 
asymmetric information have already been mentioned. 
Another example is oligopolistic structures in major 
wholesale financial markets. Many derivatives 
markets are dominated by a small number of highly 
sophisticated and complex ﬁ  nancial intermediaries. 
Their strategic behaviour is likely to have very 
different effects on those markets than the benchmark 
of perfect and atomistic markets might suggest. How 
this strategic, and maybe sometimes also predatory 
behaviour can –on occasion– have destabilising effects 
needs to be understood much better.
A more radical line of work responds to analytical 
challenges of the crisis at a more fundamental 
theoretical level. It starts from the presumption that 
certain inherent features of the standard economic 
paradigms, in particular in macroeconomics (see also 
sub-section 4|3 below), prevent them from capturing 
crucial features of exceptional situations like the 
ones experienced in the last few years. Notably, 
analytical models based on a strong tendency to 
converge towards equilibrium, a high level of market 
efﬁ  ciency and representative rational agents have 
great difﬁ  culties in generating the ampliﬁ  cation 
effects, nonlinearities and crashes characteristic 
for systemic instability (see Section 1 and Chart 1).9 
So-called agent-based models do not rely on strong 
equilibrium attractors and incorporate heterogeneous 
agents whose direct interactions have signiﬁ  cant 
inﬂ  uence on overall economic outcomes.10 They are 
based on bottom-up simulations of individual 
behaviour rather than top-down maximisations. 
They have been applied successfully to a wide range 
of problems in different sciences, including physics, 
biology, computer science, trafﬁ  c systems and mass 
panics, in particular to problems where ampliﬁ  cation, 
intermittent changes and nonlinearities play a 
significant role. It will be interesting to see to 
which extent the nascent applications to systemic 
risk can contribute to meet some of the challenges 
discussed below. Seen from the perspective of public 
authorities experiencing a crisis, which have to take 
swift and non-standard decisions in an environment 
of generalised nonlinearities, signiﬁ  cant advances in 
this new analytical ﬁ  eld are of the essence.
2|2   The transition from tranquil times 
to crises
The second set of intellectual challenges for 
ﬁ  nancial stability analysis relates to the period in 
which the system moves from stability to instability. 
One distinguishing feature of this crisis relative to 
previous crises is speed. While the unfolding of the 
sovereign debt crises in the 1980’s occurred over the 
course of years, the Asian ﬁ  nancial crisis developed, 
at its peak, over months rather than years. The major 
intensification of the present crisis, starting in 
mid-September 2008 (see Chart 1), spread around 
the globe in the course of half-days. 
In physics such phenomena are described as phase 
transitions. When some factors exceed a critical level, 
a system behaves qualitatively differently from a 
situation when the factors stay below this level. 
Building on some fundamental physics research on 
“crackling noise” and “self-organised criticality”,11 
Bouchaud (2009) describes how the random ﬁ  eld 
Ising model –originally developed to analyse how 
spins order within a disordered magnet– can be 
applied to the persistence and breakdowns of ﬁ  nancial 
bubbles. Investors take their decisions based on slowly 
moving fundamental variables, such as interest rates, 
inﬂ  ation, earnings forecasts etc. At the same time, 
however, they are inﬂ  uenced by the majority opinion 
of other investors. For that latter fact, the aggregate 
opinion can be subject to large discontinuous changes, 
even though dramatic changes do not necessarily 
happen in the fundamentals. Moreover, the physics 
analogy illustrates hysteresis in optimism. Much as 
supersaturated vapour refuses to turn into a liquid, 
optimism is self-consistently maintained (until a 
critical threshold is reached and an “avalanche” of 
opinion changes is launched). This analogy from 
physics illustrates how imbalances that have built up 
endogenously over an extended period of time can 
suddenly unravel (see sub-section 1|2). 
Another lesson in this area concerns the role of 
conﬁ  dence. Ultimately ﬁ  nancial transactions rely 
on promises about future payments. If agents begin 
to doubt such promises, trust may vanish triggering 
sharp drops in asset valuations. Arguably, this is even 
more the case in a highly complex and interconnected 
system, such as the one that decades of ﬁ  nancial 
9  See Farmer and Geanakoplos (2008) for a balanced discussion of the pros and cons of equilibrium economics. 
10  See, for example, Farmer and Foley (2009) or LeBaron (2006).
11  Sethna, Dahmen and Myers (2001) and Bak, Tang and Wiesenfeld (1988), respectively.
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deepening and sophistication have rendered. But the 
non-fundamental factors that also determine whether 
ﬁ  nancial agents have conﬁ  dence in the payment 
promises embedded in such a complex system are 
hard to characterise in quantitative models. More 
generally in practice, it is challenging to assess how 
and when conﬁ  dence abruptly evaporates at a very 
large scale, as it did for example in September 2008 
after the demise of Lehman Brothers (see Chart 1).
One direction is the analysis of asymmetric and 
imperfect information. For example, recent research 
has illustrated which factors generate adverse 
selection phenomena, so that markets dry up and 
instability propagates through contagion.12 Another 
direction is a greater incorporation of psychological 
factors in economic analyses, as actually the ﬁ  eld of 
behavioural ﬁ  nance is starting to do. Whereas the 
former approach still relies on the assumption of 
fully rational agents, the latter approach starts from 
empirical evidence that contradicts this assumption. 
Akerlof and Shiller (2009) discuss a variety of 
psychological factors that played a role in the present 
crisis, and much more work would appear beneﬁ  cial.13 
The combination of complexity, interconnectedness, 
payment promises in debt contracts, limits of 
information and basic human behaviour –“animal 
spirits”– can lead to the violent feedback and 
ampliﬁ  cation mechanisms that are so typical for the 
transition from stability to instability. For all these 
reasons, enhanced and deep market intelligence 
should continue to play a very substantial role.
2|3   Financial crises 
and the macroeconomy
The third area of intellectual challenges in ﬁ  nancial 
stability analysis relates to why authorities care so 
much about ﬁ  nancial stability, namely to which 
extent financial instability affects the overall 
economy, notably growth and consumer welfare, 
and why the transmission to the real economy may 
sometimes be so severe. Chart 2 shows the range 
of GDP growth forecasts for the euro area across 
major forecasting institutions (dashed blue line) and 
the realised GDP growth rates (solid orange line) 
12  See, for example, Heider, Hoerova and Holthausen (2009) or Morris and Shin (2010).
13  See also Barberis (2009) or Shefrin (2010).
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Note: Panel a) compares the range of euro area GDP forecasts released during 2008 
for the full year 2008 (corridor of dashed blue lines) with the ultimately measured 
2008 GDP (solid orange line). The difference between the two is the forecast error.
Note: Panel b) compares the range of euro area GDP forecasts released between 
July 2008 and June 2009 for the full year 2009 (corridor of dashed blue lines) with 
the ultimately measured 2009 GDP (solid orange line). The difference between 
the two is the forecast error.
Both panels also report year-on-year euro area GDP growth releases by Eurostat for the period ending at the quarter indicated (solid green line). The horizontal axes 
refer to the month of the respective release, except for the ultimate 2008 and 2009 GDP growth rates. The range of GDP forecasts is derived from the maximum and 
minimum point forecasts considering releases by the European Commission, IMF, OECD, Economist Consensus Forecast, Eurobarometer and Survey of Professional 
Forecasters. All growth rates are in per cent.
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as policy makers saw them during the “critical” years 
of 2008 and 2009, respectively. By comparing the 
corridor of dashed lines and the solid orange line 
in panel a) of Chart 2 one can see that all forecasting 
institutions consistently over-estimated the growth 
rate for 2008, even until very late the same year. 
Moving on to panel b) of Chart 2, it can be seen that 
the strongly negative growth rate of – 4% in 2009 
–the “free fall” in economic activity– was dramatically 
missed until the end of 2008. In this sense, left alone 
with unreliable forecasts policy-makers had to act 
on informal information, real-time data releases 
and their own wisdom and judgements on how the 
situation was evolving.
There can be many reasons for these sizable forecasting 
errors. One may simply be that it is particularly difﬁ  cult 
to look into the future in extraordinary circumstances. 
It would, however, be too simple to just stop here. 
Another reason for the errors may be that standard 
macroeconomic models, as they tend to be used as input 
in projections, do not have well developed ﬁ  nancial 
sectors and are mostly linear in nature. Therefore, 
it is not all that surprising that they were not able to 
predict the drastic effects of the ﬁ  nancial meltdown 
on growth ﬁ  gures. So, a tremendous intellectual 
challenge is to develop aggregate models that (i) give 
the central role to ﬁ  nancial systems that they actually 
play in the economy by channelling funds from ﬁ  rms, 
households and governments with surpluses to the 
agents that need them to ﬁ  nance real investment and 
smoothen consumption and (ii) incorporate states 
of widespread instability in these ﬁ  nancial systems 
that feature the characteristics discussed before 
(bank defaults and other nonlinearities, feedback and 
ampliﬁ  cation effects etc.). Although a new literature 
of macroeconomic models with “ﬁ  nancial frictions” is 
emerging, we are presently still very far from a new 
generation of macroeconomic models that would fully 
meet the challenge described.14 As this fundamental 
research ﬁ  eld advances, such models could also enrich 
the toolkit for macroeconomic forecasts. 
A related challenge can be identiﬁ  ed in the very 
important ﬁ  eld of macro-stress testing. A traditional 
stress test starts from an extreme but plausible 
macroeconomic scenario and considers its one-off 
effect on banks. Looking ahead, stress-testing 
frameworks could consider the two-way relationship 
between the ﬁ  nancial system and the economy at 
large. For example, severely weakened banks have less 
room for lending with negative effects on consumption 
and investments. Again, cumulative effects and 
ampliﬁ  cations can take place in practice, which 
would not be captured by the traditional approaches. 
Therefore, the type of aggregate models described 
before could also enrich stress-testing toolkits. 
2|4   The regulation of systemic risk
The fourth and last set of intellectual challenges 
addressed in this article deals with regulatory 
policy. How can we assess in advance whether 
regulatory measures have the desired stabilising 
effects at the level of the ﬁ  nancial system as a whole? 
This is a surprisingly new question. Most ﬁ  nancial 
regulations in the past have been assessed at the 
microprudential level, namely for their effect on 
individual intermediaries or markets. Absent 
aggregate models with realistic characterisations 
of widespread ﬁ  nancial instability, how can we 
design new macroprudential regulatory policy 
instruments and calibrate instruments known from 
the microprudential arena for the desirable effects 
on systemic stability and welfare?
Some results from the theory of complex systems 
might be read in a way that those systems cannot 
be steered with precision. As a consequence, the 
efﬁ  cient solution could be to ensure that agents in 
the system have sizable buffers in order to survive 
even extreme shocks rather than to try and remove 
or limit the risks directly. Determining how high 
those buffers should be is a demanding question. 
The view embedded into the new Basel III capital 
and liquidity framework is that such buffers need to 
be higher than was previously the case.15 
Although the new standards foresee a multitude 
of micro-based regulatory measures, they also 
entail macroprudential elements. These regulatory 
measures have been developed in response to the 
major ﬂ  aws identiﬁ  ed during the crisis, namely the 
insufﬁ  cient quantity and quality of the capital base of 
ﬁ  nancial institutions, the underestimation of liquidity 
risk as well as the build-up of excessive leverage 
14  See ECB (2010) for a survey of the literature and a more detailed description of the challenges ahead and sub-section 2|1 for the agent-based modelling approach 
as an alternative to standard macroeconomics. 
15  This framework was recently endorsed by the Governors and Heads of Supervision (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010 b, c and d).
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in the ﬁ  nancial system (one of the imbalances referred 
to in sub-section 1|2). In addition to meeting stricter 
regulatory requirements with regard to the quantity 
and quality of regulatory capital as well as liquidity 
cushions, banks will need to build up additional capital 
buffers in good times that could be drawn down in 
stress periods. A capital conservation buffer will 
serve as a “backstop” against excessive distributions 
in the form of dividends and compensation payments 
in good times. Excessive distributions may have 
contributed to destabilising the ﬁ  nancial sector as a 
whole in the recent past. The capital conservation 
buffer will be complemented with a counter-cyclical 
element that explicitly considers the macroﬁ  nancial 
environment (e.g. excess aggregate credit growth) in 
which ﬁ  nancial intermediaries operate. This capital 
buffer regime is expected to contribute to mitigating 
the inherent pro-cyclicality in the ﬁ  nancial sector 
(potentially constituting building-up and unravelling 
of widespread imbalances). 
Beyond pro-cyclicality reﬂ  ecting the build-up and 
unravelling of widespread imbalances as one form of 
systemic risk, regulators are increasingly concerned 
about the interconnectedness among systemically 
important ﬁ  nancial institutions (SIFIs) and the sizable 
externalities that these ﬁ  nancial intermediaries can 
exert on other intermediaries and the system as a 
whole (see Section 1). Economists have suggested 
recently that these intermediaries should hold higher 
capital or pay a tax or levy, respectively, in proportion 
to the risk of such externalities.16 They argued that 
if the amount of capital or the size of the tax/levy 
was determined by leverage, maturity mismatch and 
asset growth, then it would discourage intermediaries 
to become the source of such externalities. In 
practice, however, the sources and variants of such 
externalities are multiple and diverse. Recent policy 
debates show how complex and challenging it is to 
introduce such capital or liquidity surcharges in the 
present regulatory setup, not the least because of the 
difﬁ  culty to precisely and comprehensively measure 
all the externalities (systemic impact). 
Regulatory initiatives at the international level revolve 
around the following cornerstones: (i) reducing 
the probability of the failure of SIFIs; (ii) reducing 
the impact of their failure; (iii) enhancing their 
supervision and (iv) strengthening core ﬁ  nancial 
infrastructures.17 A broad consensus has arisen about 
the need for SIFIs to have higher loss absorbency 
–commensurate to their systemic importance– 
compared to non-systemic ﬁ  rms. Key work is under 
way on the identiﬁ  cation of SIFIs and the assessment 
of the magnitude of additional loss absorbency, to 
be achieved via a combination of equity surcharges 
as well as other innovative instruments, such as 
contingent capital and bail-in-able debt. In parallel, 
major efforts are ongoing to improve the resolvability 
of SIFIs.18 Prominent examples in this area are the 
establishment of effective resolution regimes, the 
development of recovery and resolution plans 
(“living wills”) and the creation of dedicated 
resolution funds. 
To address the issue of linkages and contagion, there 
is also a general drive towards directing trades to 
Central Clearing Counterparties (CCPs) whenever 
possible. This way counterparty risk can be managed 
more efﬁ  ciently and policies on haircuts can be more 
effective. The growth of CCPs into highly systemic 
institutions, however, calls for their tight supervision.
Finally, the recognition that the quality, quantity and 
timeliness of information are crucial for a sound and 
stable ﬁ  nancial system is driving efforts to improve 
data collection,19 develop stress tests into a truly 
macroprudential tool that ﬁ  ts into a policy framework 
aimed at advancing the system’s resilience, and work 
on the harmonisation of accounting standards that 
reﬂ  ect as closely as possible the economic value of 
contracts. 
Another reminder of the present crisis is the danger 
of excessive debt and leverage. For example, we know 
that the debt ﬁ  nancing of a wide range of economic 
agents (from households to large and complex 
intermediaries) without enough income, equity or 
collateral was a major cause of the instability. Since 
one locus of this problem was the heavy ﬂ  ow of credit 
into mortgage markets in a number of important 
countries, one should not neglect tools such as 
loan-to-value ratios and debt-to-income limits. Some 
Asian emerging countries have some interesting 
16 Brunnermeier  et al. (2009) and Perotti and Suarez (2009). Market friendly measures have also been suggested to help ease funding pressures on banks during a 
systemic liquidity crisis, but they need more work before becoming operational (Nicoletti-Altimari and Salleo, 2010).
17  Financial Stability Board (2010).
18  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010 a) and European Commission (2010).
19  See, for example, the mandate of Ofﬁ  ce for Financial Research set up by the United States.
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experiences with the use of such demand-side 
oriented macroprudential policy instruments.20 We 
should reﬂ  ect on whether the positive experiences 
of those countries with tightening limits would 
justify generalising them as fully countercyclical 
instruments (also relaxing them in downturns). And 
whether these experiences in emerging economies 
of relatively moderate size would be fully valid for 
sizable industrial countries with highly developed 
ﬁ  nancial systems.
From an institutional perspective, Europe has pushed 
ahead with the creation of the ESRB, a body responsible 
for the macroprudential oversight of the ﬁ  nancial 
system within the European Union. The ESRB 
will monitor systemic risk and, when necessary, 
issue warnings and policy recommendations both 
about the current situation and the medium-long 
term, starting with the toolbox described above and 
working on new instruments suited to industry 
developments. The strength of this new institution 
comes from its membership, which comprises all 
the EU central banks and ﬁ  nancial supervision 
authorities plus the Commission and a representative 
of the Council’s structures. This should ensure that 
micro- and macroprudential concerns are tackled in a 
harmonised way and that its recommendations carry 
due weight. The ESRB starts at a time that calls both 
for crisis management and for prevention. It was the 
right time to put in place such a building block of a 
truly stable and efﬁ  cient ﬁ  nancial system. 
The issue of adequate policy responses to emerging 
systemic risks becomes even more challenging in 
the international arena. Lately, global imbalances 
have been reconﬁ  rmed and could further widen 
in the future.21 While a detailed discussion of this 
speciﬁ  c issue is more the topic of other papers 
in this volume and goes beyond the scope of this 
article, we need to think more about how to make 
the international monetary system more resilient to 
such imbalances and policy structures more ﬂ  exible 
in addressing them more effectively than the case 
in the past. 
20  See Committee on the Global Financial System (2010) for an overview of the actual use of these and other macroprudential policy instruments in the past. 
21  See Boissay (2010) for a recent paper on the origins of such imbalances and their role for ﬁ  nancial stability.
Identifying and mitigating systemic risk is the key challenge for policy makers in the era of macroprudential 
oversight, which has just started. This requires analytical frameworks and tools to understand and counter it. 
Authorities need to deepen their understanding of the fundamental working of ﬁ  nancial systems and the 
risks they generate. They need to develop a better assessment of when and how systems migrate from 
stability to instability. They need to develop models that truly capture the interactions between widespread 
ﬁ  nancial instability, aggregate consumption, investment and growth. And, they need to further extend the 
latter to be able to assess the effectiveness and efﬁ  ciency of regulatory policies in containing systemic risks. 
Meeting this tall agenda will be challenging in the years ahead. It will require reorienting signiﬁ  cant 
resources in academia, central banks and supervisory authorities in these directions. It will also require 
enriching the way of thinking in economics and ﬁ  nance. New approaches should be considered that do not 
necessarily rely only on the notions of equilibrium, universal rationality and efﬁ  ciency, but go beyond those 
concepts. Approaches that have been used successfully in other ﬁ  elds, such as the natural sciences, 
may be a helpful source of inspiration.
The ESCB has launched a large research effort in order to extend the analytical apparatus available in 
our central banks. We call it the MaRs, for Macroprudential Research network. Many researchers from 
all EU central banks are contributing to it, following three work areas: 1) macroﬁ  nancial models linking 
ﬁ  nancial stability and the performance of the economy; 2) early warning systems and systemic risk 
indicators; and 3) assessing contagion risks. MaRs will report on its main results in 2012 and until then 
intensify exchanges with academics and researchers outside central banks.
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